The role of emotional engagement and mood valence in retrieval fluency of mood incongruent autobiographical memory by Jonathan Greenberg & Nachshon Meiran
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 07 February 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00083
The role of emotional engagement and mood valence in
retrieval fluency of mood incongruent autobiographical
memory
Jonathan Greenberg* and Nachshon Meiran





Rebecca Watson, University of
Glasgow, UK
Mario F. Juruena, University of São
Paulo, Brazil
*Correspondence:
Jonathan Greenberg, Department of
Psychology and Zlotowski Center for
Neuroscience, Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev, Guzik Bldg
(97)-Room 121, PO Box 653, Beer
Sheva 84105, Israel
e-mail: greenbej@post.bgu.ac.il
Background: Retrieval of opposite mood autobiographical memories serves emotion
regulation, yet the factors influencing this ability are poorly understood.
Methods: Three studies examined the effect of mood valence (sad vs. happy) and degree
of emotional engagement on fluency of mood incongruent retrieval by manipulating
emotional engagement and examining the effect of emotional film clips on the Fluency
of Autobiographical Memory task.
Results: Following both sad and happy film clips, participants who received emotionally
engaging instructions exhibited a greater recall latency of the first opposite mood memory,
and had generated less such memories than those receiving emotionally disengaging
instructions (Studies 1 and 2). A happy mood induction resulted in recollection of fewer
mood incongruent memories compared to a sad mood induction. Providing emotionally
engaging instructions was found to specifically hinder mood incongruent retrieval, without
impairing mood congruent retrieval (Study 3).
Conclusion: High emotional engagement seems to impair the retrieval of mood
incongruent memories. Being in a happy mood may also partially impair such retrieval.
Implications regarding emotional regulation are discussed.
Keywords: emotional engagement, valence, emotion regulation, mood incongruent retrieval, fluency of
autobiographical memories
INTRODUCTION
Imagine your negative mood after failing an exam or after receiv-
ing a rejection letter from a journal. One way to boost your mood
after such an event might be to recall the high grade you have
recently received, an article that has been accepted recently to a
prestigious journal, or the warm hug you received from some-
one you love. It is your ability to recall these mood incongruent
memories that may dictate the success in down-regulating the
negative mood.
The ability to recall mood related memories has been stud-
ied as a part of the more general issue concerning the relation
between mood and memory. A common way of exploring this
relationship has been to compare the retrieval of memories that
match the current mood (mood congruent recall) with retrieval
of memories opposite in valence to the current mood (mood
incongruent recall; for reviews see Blaney, 1986; Singer and
Salovey, 1988; Matt et al., 1992; Rusting, 1999; Barry et al., 2004).
In this work, we are interested in the latter, and focus primar-
ily on the ability to retrieve mood incongruent autobiographical
memories.
As the example above suggests, retrieving mood incongruent
autobiographical memories seems of particular importance first
and foremost due to its role in the regulation of emotion (see Isen
et al., 1978; Isen, 1984; Rusting and DeHart, 2000). In a series of
experiments performed by Parrott and Sabini (1990), individuals
in a sad mood recalled happier memories than individuals in a
happy mood. This was evident both in field quasi-experiments
(e.g., comparing memory valence of students who received a bad
grade vs. a good grade and comparingmemory valence of individ-
uals on cloudy days vs. sunny days) and in three lab experiments
involving mood induction. Similarly, in a study by Josephson
(1996), following either sad or neutral mood inductions partic-
ipants were requested to recall two autobiographical memories,
and choose them to be either positive or negative in valence. The
majority of participants in the sad condition recalled a happy
second memory, and most of them explicitly stated that they
deliberately recruited those happy memories in order to coun-
teract their negative moods. Thus, mood incongruent retrieval
seems an important and common means of emotion regulation.
A second reason for the importance of focusing on mood incon-
gruent retrieval regards its relation to depression (e.g., Blaney,
1986). Previous findings have indicated that depressed individuals
tend to use maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (Campbell-
Sills et al., 2006; Garnefski and Kraaij, 2006), yet a recent study
has found that despite having a difficulty in benefitting from
mood incongruent recall when focusing of the memories in an
abstract and ruminative manner, depressed individuals signifi-
cantly improved their moods by retrieving and focusing on mood
incongruent memories in a concrete and non-analytical manner
(Werner-Seidler and Moulds, 2012).
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The question addressed in this work is what dictates the
retrieval fluency of opposite mood memories? While previous
research has suggested several correlates of emotional memory
retrieval in general, such as personality traits of neuroticism and
extraversion (Denkova et al., 2012) and increased brain activ-
ity in regions such as the amygdala, hippocampus, and several
regions in the prefrontal cortex (see Svoboda et al., 2006; Denkova
et al., 2013; Young et al., 2013), the factors that specifically influ-
ence the retrieval of memories that are opposite to the current
mood are still relatively poorly understood. Some authors (Isen,
1985; Singer and Salovey, 1988; Rusting, 1998) have suggested
that mood incongruent memories are less accessible when in a
happy mood than in a sad mood. Others have suggested that
such difficulty in retrieval of mood incongruent happy autobi-
ographical memories actually reflects levels of sadness (Sheppes
and Meiran, 2007). In the current work we examined these two
valence-specific hypotheses, along with an alternative hypothesis
suggesting that emotional engagement plays a central role in deter-
mining how mood influences the fluency of retrieval of mood
incongruent autobiographical memories. We refer to emotional
engagement here as the extent to which one is involved in the
emotional experience. We note that although the degree of emo-
tional engagement may be related to emotional intensity, the two
are not synonymous, as one may feel intense emotion, yet may
turn away and disengage from it [e.g., through application of
emotion regulation strategies such as suppression or response
modulation (see Gross, 2001)].
The plausibility of emotional engagement as a determining
factor in the retrieval of mood incongruent memories may be
illustrated by drawing an analogy between mood incongruent
retrieval and task switching (see Greenberg and Meiran, 2013).
The task switching paradigm (see Kiesel et al., 2010; Meiran,
2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010 for reviews) involves asking
participants to rapidly switch between different tasks including
speeded choice tasks, memory retrieval tasks, and so forth. There
is a relatively wide agreement among researchers that this switch-
ing involves a behavioral cost, due to the need to change the
task-set, which may be described as the configuration of the cog-
nitive system needed in order to perform the task. Moreover,
evidence suggests that these costs are caused (perhaps in part)
by the difficulty in disengaging from the previously relevant task
set. A particular finding which supports this conclusion is “switch
asymmetry,” which refers to the fact that the more engaging a task
is (or appears to be, see Barutchu et al., 2013), the longer it takes
to disengage from it in order to switch to a different task (e.g.,
Allport et al., 1994; Yeung and Monsell, 2003). Note that mood
resembles task sets in many respects. Like task sets, mood pre-
pares the organism to act and think in a manner appropriate for
the given context. The analogy between task sets and mood sug-
gests that the greater the engagement in a particular mood, the
“deeper” one is immersed in it and allocates attention resources
to it, and the more difficult it would be to switch to a different
mood. As a result, greater mood engagement is expected to impair
the subsequent retrieval of opposite mood memories (see Bower,
1981).
In Study 1, we examined the effect of emotional engage-
ment on retrieval fluency of mood incongruent memories by
manipulating emotional engagement in two different ways: pro-
viding instructions to engage vs. disengage emotionally and
manipulating the duration of the clips used (long vs. short) to
elicit the emotion. Our dependent measure was based on partici-
pants’ performance on the Fluency of Autobiographical Memory
(FAM) task (Sheppes and Meiran, 2007; Greenberg and Meiran,
2013) in which participants are asked to recall as many autobi-
ographical events as possible that are linked to the opposite-to-
induced emotion. Sheppes and Meiran examined two dependent
measures: recall latency of the first opposite mood memory, and
the total number of memories recalled. In their study, the gen-
eration of positive autobiographical memories was found to be
highly sensitive to emotion manipulation (negatively valenced
vs. positively valenced film clips), with partial µ2 values exceed-
ing 0.30.
Sheppes and Meiran (2007), who examined recollection of
happymemories, claimed that FAM indexes the degree of sadness.
If this were the case, less fluency (a greater latency in recalling the
first opposite mood memory and a smaller number of total gen-
erated memories) is expected following a sad film compared to
a happy film. Since the sad valence of the mood in considered
to interfere with mood incongruent retrieval as measured by the
FAM, we consider this prediction in a “sad valence hypothesis.”
Conversely, if retrieval of mood incongruent memories is more
difficult following happy moods (Isen, 1985; Singer and Salovey,
1988; Rusting, 1998) a reversed pattern is to be expected, with less
fluency following a happy film, a prediction which we consider
in a “happy valence hypothesis.” Additionally, if degree of emo-
tional engagement is a significant determining factor in mood
incongruent retrieval, an alternative outcome is predicted via an
“engagement hypothesis,” in which less fluency is expected fol-
lowing high levels of emotional engagement, regardless of mood
valence (negative or positive). Following the analogy to the task
switching paradigm, we consider the latency in first opposite
mood memory generation as the primary index for emotional
engagement, as this latency assesses the time needed initially dis-
engage from the current mood. The total number of opposite
mood memories generated indexes fluency of memories after the
initial disengagement, which has previously been suggested as an
index for “recovery speed” from the emotional experience (see
Greenberg and Meiran, 2013).
Study 1 examined the effects of emotional engagement on
mood incongruent retrieval following sad and happy mood
inductions in a set order (sad induction first, happy induction
second). Study 2 used a similar procedure as Study 1 using only
a happy mood induction, to control for potential order effects.
Study 3 examined the effect of mood inductions on mood con-
gruent rather than incongruent retrieval to assess whether effects
of emotional engagement on autobiographical memory retrieval




Participants were 42 undergraduate students studying at Ben-
Gurion University (35 women, mean age 23.74, SD = 2.92).
Participants were recruited via posters around the university
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campus, and were assigned to the four groups according to the
order in which they entered the experiment. The four groups
were formed by the factorial combination of 2 independent
variables—Instructions Type (engaging vs. disengaging) and Film
Clip Duration (long vs. short). Data of one male participant were
excluded due to a technical error. Data from one female partici-
pant were excluded from the FAM recall latency analysis due to
her failure to press the space bar upon recollection of the first
memory, which prevented her RT logging. The FAM RT data
that were eventually analyzed were from 10 participants in each
group. The four groups did not differ in age [F(3, 36) = 1.01, ns]
or gender (minimal p = 0.46, Fisher’s exact test).
Film stimuli
Films were taken from Sheppes and Meiran (2007). The sad-
ness eliciting film was a documentary depicting the story of a
soldier killed in military action and his bereaved relatives and
girlfriend. The film was edited to create a long (2:21min) and a
short (0:33min) version for the two clip length conditions. The
happiness/amusement eliciting film lasted 5:19min and consisted
of 2 scenes from a well known comedy duo act in a program
called “The Assi and Guri show,” in which the two comedians
pantomime a live music band and later on perform an “inter-
view” in which one elaborates on his “fake” and eccentric alien
abduction experiences. This film was edited as well to create a
long (5:19min) and a short (0:39min) version. The short versions
were edited like trailers and summarized the long versions while
including most of the information. The happy film has targeted
primarily humor and amusement, yet the film has been validated
to illicit self reported happiness. Likewise, the sad film has been
validated to illicit self reported sadness (Sheppes and Meiran,
2007). The happy and sad clips were unequal in length. This, how-
ever, does not pose a problem for our study since according to
the positive and negative valence hypotheses, the two kinds of
films are supposed to yield opposing effects on autobiographi-
cal memory retrieval fluency while according to the engagement
hypothesis, the influence on memory retrieval should not depend
on valence. We will return to this point in the General Discussion.
Measures
Self reported emotion ratings. At the beginning of the experi-
ment as well as immediately following each film clip, participants
were asked to rate their general emotional mood (from “very bad
mood” to “very good mood”) as well as degree of happiness and
sadness on a scale ranging from 1 to 9, as a measure of emotion
intensity.
FAM. FAM instructions were similar to those used by Sheppes
and Meiran (2007), with the addition of recollection of sad mem-
ories following the happy film (see Greenberg and Meiran, 2013).
Following the film clips, participants completed the self reported
mood ratings. They were then asked to recall a specific personal
happy memory (or a specific sad one following the happy film
clip). The specific valence (sad or happy) of the memory to be
recalled was mentioned at the end of the FAM instructions in
order to prevent participants from starting to recall memories
prior to the start of the time clock. Upon recollection partici-
pants pressed the space bar (in order for the computer to log the
time to recall the memory), wrote down a key word summing up
the event (which they would later use to describe the memory in
detail) and continued to recall the next memory until 2:40min
had elapsed. The 2:40min limit was determined by Sheppes and
Meiran based on pilot data indicating that very few additional
memories were retrieved after this time. The participants were
then asked to provide a relatively detailed description of each of
the memories next to each of the keywords they had written, in
order to ensure that the memories fit the required mood and that
they were different from one another. This was explained to the
participants in advance.
Emotional engagement instructions
Prior to each emotion induction, participants in all four groups
received oral instructions which they were asked to execute while
watching the upcoming film clip. The groups receiving engag-
ing instructions were given the following instructions in Hebrew
(the participants’ native language): “Please attend carefully to
the following film clip. If any emotions or feelings arise while
watching, please allow yourself to fully experience these feelings,
without distancing or blocking yourself from them in any way.”
The groups receiving disengaging instructions were given the fol-
lowing instructions: “Please attend carefully to the following film
clip, but watch it in a non-emotional manner. Try to view the film
objectively and neutrally, paying attention to the facts but keeping
yourself emotionally distant and uninvolved.” These instructions
were given twice to each participant, once before each mood
inducing film.
Procedure
After signing an informed consent form, participants completed
the following tasks: They completed a baseline self reportedmood
check of sadness, happiness, and general mood, then received
emotional engagement/disengagement instructions, watched the
sad mood film (short or long depending on the condition
assigned to the group), completed another self reported mood
check, performed the FAM task (of happy memories), received
the same viewing instructions as before, watched a happy film
(short or long depending on the condition assigned to the group),
completed a final self reported mood check followed by a another
FAM task (of sadmemories), and were then debriefed. We did not
counterbalance film clips primarily to standardize testing order in
an effort to maximize statistical power.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results were analyzed using Alpha = 0.05. In examin-
ing effects with a predicted direction (according to each of
the three main hypotheses detailed in the Introduction sec-
tion) we employed confirmatory one-tailed t-test contrasts by
using the Analysis of variance (ANOVA) MSes (converting the
ANOVA scores into t-scores enabled the one-tailed examina-
tion of the hypotheses with a predicted direction). Other (non-
hypothesized) effects are reported using standard exploratory
ANOVA analyses (as in all experiments hereby reported).
Time to generate the first memory
A mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the time to gen-
erate the first memory, with the between-subjects independent
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variables being Instructions Type (engaging vs. disengaging)
and Clip Length (long vs. short) and the within subjects vari-
able Mood Induction Type (happy vs. sad). Using the appro-
priate MSes from the ANOVA, we examined the one-tailed
contrast t-tests according to each hypothesis. According to the
“engagement hypothesis,” the time to generate the first oppo-
site memory (the primary measure for emotional engagement
as detailed in the Introduction section) should be longer for
participants in the emotionally engaging conditions compared
to participants in emotionally disengaging conditions. Results
from emotionally engaging instructions support this hypoth-
esis, as participants in the emotionally engaging instructions
condition (M = 9.29 s, SD = 3.24) took more than twice
the time to generate the first opposite mood memory than
those in the emotionally engaging instructions condition [M
= 4.4 s, SD = 8.77; t(36) = 3.06, p < 0.01; see Figure 1]. This
effect of emotional engagement via instructions was not quali-
fied by an interaction with Induction Type [F(1, 36) = 0.13, ns]
and was statistically comparable for happy memories follow-
ing the sad induction [t(36) = 2.18, p < 0.05] and sad mem-
ories following the happy induction [t(36) = 2.41, p = 0.01].
No differences were found between clip length conditions
[t(36) = 0.95, ns].
According to the “happy valence hypothesis,” the time to
generate the first opposite memory should be significantly
longer following the happy film compared to the sad film.
According to the “sad valence hypothesis” the opposite is pre-
dicted. In contrast to both of these hypotheses, results indicate
that the time to generate the first opposite memory follow-
ing the happy film (M = 7.06 s, SD = 7.03) did not signif-
icantly differ than that of the sad film [M = 6.64 s, SD =
7.06; t(36)=0.30, ns]. No other main effects or interactions in
the exploratory ANOVA approached significance (Maximal F =
0.90, ns). Thus, opposite mood memory generation time results
support the contribution of emotional engagement but do not
support the contribution of specific valence in mood incongruent
retrieval.
FIGURE 1 | Mean time to generate the first opposite mood memory in
emotionally engaging instruction conditions in Study 1. ∗p < 0.05.
Total number of memories generated
We performed a Three-Way mixed ANOVA with the independent
variables Instruction Type (engaging vs. disengaging) and Clip
Length (long vs. short) as between subjects variables and Mood
Induction Type (happy vs. sad) as the within subject variable.
The total number of memories indexes the fluency of memories
after the initial disengagement from the emotion, and thus, is
a secondary rather than primary measure of emotional engage-
ment. Nevertheless, according to the “engagement hypothesis”
participants in emotionally engaging conditions are expected
to recall fewer memories than participants in the emotionally
disengaging conditions. Once again, results from emotionally
engaging instructions support this hypothesis, as participants
in the emotionally engaging instructions condition (M = 9.75
memories, SD = 2.92) recalled fewer memories than those in
the emotionally disengaging instructions condition [M = 11.52,
SD = 3.60; t(37) = 1.69, p < 0.05; see Figure 2]. This effect was
prevalent regardless of Induction Type, as indexed by the non-
significant interaction [F(1, 37) = 0.08, ns]. Nonetheless, the effect
of Instruction Type within each emotion failed reaching statisti-
cal significance, probably due to lack of statistical power [t(37) =
1.62, 1.59, p = 0.06 after the sad clip and happy clip, respec-
tively]. No differences were found between clip length conditions
[t(37) = 0.50, ns].
According to the “happy valence hypothesis,” fewer memories
are expected to be recalled following the happy film compared to
the sad film. According to the “sad valence hypothesis” the oppo-
site is predicted. Results indicate that fewer mood incongruent
memories were recalled after the happy film (M = 10.05, SD
= 3.37) than after the happy film [M = 11.24, SD = 3.71;
t(37) = 3.37, p < 0.01; see Figure 2], regardless of Instruction
FIGURE 2 | Total number of memories recalled in emotionally
engaging instruction and mood induction conditions in Study 1 (The
figure shows that the increase in the number of recalled memories
due to disengaging instructions was roughly the same for sad and
happy mood induction). ∗A significant main effect for instruction type:
more opposite mood memories recalled following emotionally disengaging
instructions than following emotionally engaging instructions. ∗∗A
significant main effect for mood induction: more opposite mood memories
recalled following a sad induction than following a happy induction.
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 83 | 4
Greenberg and Meiran Emotional engagement and memory fluency
Type or Clip Length. No other effect or interaction approached
significance (Maximal F = 1.97, ns).
Thus, results from total number of memories recalled pro-
vide additional and converging support for the “engagement
hypothesis” using emotionally engaging instructions, and addi-
tionally provide some evidence supporting the “happy valence
hypothesis.”
Self reported mood checks
Means are listed in Table 1. No significant differences were found
between Instruction Type conditions or between Clip Length
conditions in baseline pre-induction measures of happiness, gen-
eral mood, or sadness (maximal t = 0.57, ns). A Multivariate
ANOVA 1 (MANOVA) of Instruction Type (engaging vs. non-
engaging), Clip Length (long vs. short), and Induction Type
(pre-induction, sad induction, happy induction) as the indepen-
dent variables, and ratings on the three Rating Types (happy,
general mood, sad) as the dependent variables was conducted.
To check our manipulation, the main effect for Induction Type
was examined and found to be significant [Wilks’ Lambda= 0.21,
F(6, 32) = 19.71, p < 0.001]. Subsequent univariate ANOVAs
revealed that both happy [F(1, 37) = 73.94, p < 0.001] and gen-
eral mood ratings [F(1, 37) = 43.44, p < 0.001] were lower, and
sad ratings [F(1, 37) = 28.60, p < 0.001] were higher, after a
sad mood induction than at baseline (pre-induction) level.
The opposite was found when comparing ratings following a
happy induction to ratings following a sad induction, with
happy [F(1, 37) = 123.84, p < 0.001] and general mood rat-
ings [F(1, 38) = 65.50, p < 0.001] being higher, and sad ratings
[F(1, 37) = 74.56, p < 0.001] being lower after a happy induction.
These indicate that mood inductions elicited the desired moods.
1Although this analysis could have been performed in a repeated measures
ANOVA, a MANOVA seemed more appropriate, as it may serve as an alterna-
tive with a decreased risk of assumption violation (see O’Brien and Kaiser,
1985). Additionally, MANOVA may be more appropriate since, properly
speaking, the mood checks were a series of tests rather than the same test
measured repeatedly, as assumed in ANOVA.
The MANOVA also yielded a significant interaction of
Induction Type (pre-induction, sad induction, happy induc-
tion) × Instruction Type (engaging vs. non-engaging) [Wilks’
Lambda= 0.66, F(6, 32) = 2.80, p < 0.05]. The following univari-
ate ANOVAs indicated that self reported moods of participants
who received emotionally engaging instructions were significantly
more affected than those who received disengaging instructions,
on all rating types, in all induction types. Specifically, follow-
ing a sad mood induction, participants who received emotion-
ally engaging instructions exhibited a greater decline in happy
[F(1, 37) = 10.71, p < 0.01] and general mood [F(1, 37) = 9.85,
p < 0.01] ratings, and a greater incline in sad rating [F(1, 37) =
9.40, p < 0.01] than participants who received emotionally dis-
engaging instructions, compared to baseline mood ratings. In
contrast, following a happy mood induction, participants who
received emotionally engaging instructions exhibited a greater
incline in happy [F(1, 37) = 13.43, p < 0.001] and general mood
[F(1, 37) = 11.08, p < 0.01] ratings, and a greater decline in
sad rating [F(1, 37) = 14.90, p < 0.001] than participants who
received emotionally disengaging instructions, compared to rat-
ings following the sad induction.
The third and final significant effect found in the MANOVA
was that of Induction Type × Clip Length (short vs. long) [Wilks’
Lambda = 0.66, F(6, 32) = 2.69, p < 0.05]. Subsequent ANOVAs
indicated that following a sad induction, participants who viewed
a long clip exhibited a greater decline in happy [F(1, 37) = 11.81,
p < 0.01] and general mood [F(1, 37) = 10.68, p < 0.01], and a
greater incline in sad ratings [F(1, 37) = 5.30, p < 0.05], than par-
ticipants who viewed a short clip, compared to baseline ratings. In
contrast, following a happy induction, participants who viewed a
long clip exhibited a greater incline in happy [F(1, 37) = 8.95, p <
0.01] and general mood [F(1, 37) = 13.06, p < 0.001] ratings,
and a greater decline in sad ratings [F(1, 37) = 10.25, p < 0.01]
than participants who viewed a short clip, compared to ratings
following the happy mood induction.
Thus, since participants who received emotionally engaging
instructions had exhibited more than double the recall latency
of the first opposite mood memory, and generated overall less
Table 1 | Means and SD’s (in parenthesis) of self reported happiness, general mood, and sadness ratings in Study 1, in the different emotional
engagement conditions.
Baseline Post sad induction Post happy induction
Engaging instructions Happiness 6.25 (0.91) 3.95 (1.70) 6.95 (1.32)
Gen. mood 6.80 (1.00) 4.75 (1.45) 7.30 (0.92)
Sadness 2.65 (1.93) 5.55 (1.93) 2.10 (1.29)
Disengaging instructions Happiness 6.14 (1.42) 5.10 (1.64) 6.62 (1.36)
Gen. mood 6.57 (1.47) 5.81 (1.40) 6.90 (1.49)
Sadness 2.90 (2.05) 3.71 (2.08) 2.38 (1.75)
Long clip Happiness 6.24 (0.94) 3.95 (1.86) 6.76 (1.48)
Gen. mood 6.76 (0.83) 4.71 (1.45) 7.29 (1.06)
Sadness 2.62 (1.91) 5.25 (2.34) 2.00 (1.22)
Short clip Happiness 6.15 (1.42) 5.15 (1.42) 6.80 (1.20)
Gen. mood 6.60 (1.60) 5.90 (1.33) 6.90 (1.41)
Sadness 2.95 (1.06) 4.00 (1.89) 2.50 (1.79)
Scales of all measures range from 1 to 10.
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opposite mood memories than participants who received emo-
tionally disengaging instructions, results of the current study
support the emotional engagement hypothesis, and suggest that
high levels of emotional engagement hinder mood incongru-
ent retrieval, compared to low levels of emotional engagement.
Weaker support was found for the “happy valence hypothesis,” as
participants overall recalled fewer opposite mood memories fol-
lowing a happy film compared to a sad film, yet this hypothesis
was not supported using the first memory recall latency measure.
No support was found for the “sad mood hypothesis.”
Manipulating emotional engagement through length of emo-
tion eliciting film clips did not significantly influence mood
incongruent retrieval. One possible post-hoc explanation for this
is that in our study, in an attempt to maintain clip coherence,
short clips became “condensed” versions of long clips thereby
maintaining high emotional “potency,” which has been previously
shown to inhibit mood incongruent recall (Rinck et al., 1992).
Another possible explanation is that a floor effect occurred since
in order to insure a significant emotional effect, both the dura-
tions we had used may be considered rather “long” (minimum of
0:33min) compared to other studies eliciting emotion (e.g., Isen
et al., 1978; Sakaki, 2007; Ball and Hennessey, 2009).
STUDY 2
Results of Study 1 demonstrated that emotional engagement
hindered mood incongruent autobiographical retrieval following
both sad and happy film clips. Film order in Study 1was fixed
(sad film first, happy film second) in an effort to maximize sta-
tistical power. It thus, may be claimed that performance on the
FAM after the happy film (which came second) might have been
affected by viewing the first (sad) film or by the recent recol-
lection of happy memories. The aim of Study 2 was to provide
a firmer base for the results obtained in Study 1 regarding the
effects of emotional engagement on mood incongruent retrieval
(i.e., the “engagement hypothesis”) by ruling out the possibility
of such order effects via administering the FAM for mood incon-




Participants were 37 undergraduate students studying at Ben-
Gurion University (24 women, mean age 24.05, SD = 1.61). Since
Clip Length did not affect FAM performance in Study 1, partic-
ipants in this study were assigned to only two Instruction Type
groups (emotionally engaging instruction group vs. an emotion-
ally disengaging instruction group), according to the order in
which they entered the experiment. Data from three participants
were excluded from FAM analysis due to their failure to press the
space bar upon recollection of the first memory, which prevented
her RT logging. FAM data were analyzed were from 18 partici-
pants from the emotionally engaged group, and 16 participants
from the disengaged group. The two groups did not differ in age
[t(32) = 1.29, ns] nor in gender (p = 0.08, Fisher’s exact test).
Film Stimuli
The only film used was the longer version (5:19min) of the happy
film used in Study 1, from the Israeli standup comedy act “The
Assi and Guri show.”
Measures
Self reported emotion ratings, FAM, and emotionally engaging
and disengaging instructions were all identical to those in Study
1, yet were used only for a happy film.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Study 1, apart for the fact
that the only film used was the happy film and the only FAM
administered was that of sad memories.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Time to generate the first memory
A t-test was conducted comparing the two instruction type
groups in the time to generate the first opposite mood memory.
As predicted by the “engagement hypothesis,” the emotionally
engaging instruction group (M = 6.29 s, SD = 3.43) took sig-
nificantly longer to generate the first sad memory than the emo-
tionally disengaging instruction group [M = 4.37 s, SD = 1.36;
t(32) = 2.08, p < 0.05; see Figure 3].
Total number of memories generated
In a similar t-test, the emotionally engaging instruction group (M
= 7.56, SD = 2.45) generated less sad memories following the
happy film than the emotionally disengaging instruction group
[M = 9.69, SD = 4.09; t(32)=1.87, p < 0.05; see Figure 4].
The fact that the current study obtained similar results to those
obtained in Study 1 regarding emotional engagement following a
happy mood induction, yet without previous experience with a
sad mood induction or with retrieval of happy memories rule out
order effects as an alternative account for the results of Study 1.
Self reported mood checks
Means are listed in Table 2. No significant differences were found
between groups in baseline pre-induction measures of happiness,
general mood, or sadness (maximal t = 1.23, ns). A MANOVA
of Instruction Type group (engaging instructions vs. disengaging
instructions) and Induction (pre-induction, happy induction) as
the independent variables, and ratings on the three Rating Types
FIGURE 3 | Mean time to generate the first opposite mood memory in
emotionally engaging instruction conditions in Study 2. ∗p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 4 | Total number of memories recalled in emotionally
engaging instruction conditions in Study 2. ∗p < 0.05
(happy, general mood, sad) as the dependent variables was con-
ducted. A main effect was found for Induction [Wilks’ Lambda =
0.59, F(3, 33) = 7.58, p = 0.001]. Subsequent univariate ANOVAs
revealed that both happy [F(1, 35) = 16.04, p < 0.001] and gen-
eral mood ratings [F(1, 35) = 21.27, p < 0.001] were higher, and
sad ratings [F(1, 35) = 7.35, p = 0.01] were lower, after the happy
mood induction than at baseline (pre-induction) level. This indi-
cates that the mood induction elicited the desired moods.
The mood induction did not affect self reported mood checks
of the two groups differently. This has been evident by the
non-significant interaction between Induction (pre-induction vs.
happy induction) and group (engaging instructions vs. disengag-
ing instructions) [F(3, 33) = 2.13, ns].
Self reported mood checks require that participants rate the
intensity of each emotion on a scale ranging from 1 to 9. The
fact that the groups differed in FAM performance but not differ
in self-reported mood checks provides evidence that emotional
engagement and emotion intensity are separate and independent
from one another. Although high emotional engagement may be
accompanied by high levels of emotional intensity (see Study 1
Table 2 | Means and SD’s (in parenthesis) of self reported happiness,




Engaging instructions Happiness 6.11 (2.05) 7.17 (1.54)
Gen. mood 6.11 (2.00) 7.61 (1.61)
Sadness 2.83 (2.15) 2.22 (1.77)
Disengaging instructions Happiness 6.11 (1.24) 6.79 (1.55)
Gen. mood 6.63 (1.38) 7.11 (1.29)
Sadness 2.21 (0.92) 1.79 (1.23)
Scales of all measures range from 1 to 10.
and 3), this is not always the case, as evident in the current study.
The fact that the groups differed in FAM performance but not in
self-reported mood checks supports the notion that impairments
in mood incongruent retrieval were not due to the intensity of the
emotion but rather due to emotional engagement.
STUDY 3
Results of Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that high levels of emo-
tional engagement hinder mood incongruent autobiographical
retrieval. The aim of Study 3 was to validate that this hindrance
is specific to mood incongruent autobiographical retrieval rather
than a hindrance to autobiographical retrieval in general. To this
end, participants received emotionally engaging or disengaging
instructions and viewed emotion eliciting films as in Study 1, yet
the FAM measure was used to examine mood congruent rather
than incongruent memories. The claim that high levels of emo-
tional engagement hinder autobiographical memory retrieval in
general (rather than only mood incongruent retrieval) leads to
the hypothesis that that, as in Study 1and 2, participants receiving
emotionally engaging instructions would take longer to generate
the first mood congruent memory, and/or will generate less such
memories than those receiving disengaging instructions.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 28 undergraduate students studying at Ben-
Gurion University (14 women, mean age 25.14, SD = 1.21). As
in Study 2, participants assigned to only two groups (emotionally
engaging instruction group vs. emotionally disengaging instruc-
tion group) of 14 participants each, according to the order in
which they entered the experiment. The two groups did not dif-
fer in age [t(26) = 1.26, ns] nor in gender (p = 0.65, Fisher’s exact
test).
Film stimuli
The films used were the longer versions of the sad (story of a
soldier killed in military action) and happy (the Israeli standup
comedy act “The Assi and Guri show”) films used in Study 1.
Measures
Self reported emotion ratings, FAM, and emotionally engaging
and disengage instructions were all identical to those in Study
1, with the exception of retrieving mood congruent rather than
incongruent memories (i.e., recalling sad memories following the
sad film and happy memories following the happy film).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Study 1, as was film order
(sad film first, happy film second).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Time to generate the first memory
ATwoWay ANOVAwas conducted with Instruction Type (engag-
ing vs. disengaging) and Mood Induction Type (sad vs. happy)
as the independent variables and time to generate the first mem-
ory as the dependent variable. According to the hypothesis that
high emotional engagement hinders autobiographical memory
retrieval in general, participants receiving emotionally engaging
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instructions should take longer to generate the first mood congru-
ent memory. This hypothesis was not supported, as no differences
were found between emotional engagement conditions [t(26) =
0.96, ns]. Moreover, an opposite trend to that of Studies 1 and
2 was found, in which participants receiving emotionally engag-
ing instructions (M = 4.24 s, SD = 1.64) were (non-significantly)
quicker than those receiving emotionally disengaging instructions
(M = 5.73 s, SD = 5.58) in retrieving the first memory. No
other effects approached significance in the ANOVA [Maximal
F(1, 26) = 0.92, ns].
Total number of memories generated
A similar ANOVA was conducted with Total Number of
Memories as the dependent variable. Once again, no support
was found for the hypothesis that high emotional engagement
hinders autobiographical memory retrieval in general, as no dif-
ferences were found between emotional engagement conditions
[t(26) = 1.00, ns]. Moreover, an opposite trend to that of Studies
1 and 2 emerged, in which those receiving emotionally engaging
instructions (M = 9.43, SD = 2.62) generated (non-significantly)
more memories than those receiving emotionally disengaging
instructions [M = 8.29, SD = 3.40].
A main effect was found for Mood Induction Type [F(1, 26) =
5.37, p < 0.05], in whichmore happy (M = 9.43, SD= 3.53) than
sad (M = 8.29, SD = 3.08) memories were generated, regardless
of Instruction Type.
Self reported mood checks
Means are listed in Table 3. No significant differences were found
between Instruction Type conditions in baseline pre-induction
measures of happiness, general mood, or sadness (maximal t =
1.31, ns). AMultivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) of Instruction Type
(engaging vs. non-engaging), and Induction Type (pre-induction,
sad induction, happy induction) as the independent variables,
and ratings on the three Rating Types (happy, general mood, sad)
as the dependent variables was conducted.
A significant main effect was found for Induction Type [Wilks’
Lambda = 0.167, F(6, 21) = 17.47, p < 0.001]. Subsequent uni-
variate ANOVAs revealed that both happy [F(1, 26) = 46.52, p <
0.001] and general mood ratings [F(1, 26) = 59.22, p < 0.001]
were lower, and sad ratings [F(1, 26) = 43.97, p < 0.001] were
higher, after a sad mood induction than at baseline (pre-
induction) level. The opposite was found when comparing ratings
following a happy induction to ratings following a sad induction,
with happy [F(1, 26) = 80.56, p < 0.001] and general mood rat-
ings [F(1, 26) = 94.89, p < 0.001] being higher, and sad ratings
[F(1, 26) = 35.77, p < 0.001] being lower after a happy induction.
These indicate that mood inductions elicited the desired moods.
The MANOVA also yielded a significant interaction of
Induction Type (pre-induction, sad induction, happy induction)
× Instruction Type (engaging vs. non-engaging) [Wilks’ Lambda
= 0.52, F(6, 21) = 3.21, p < 0.05]. The following univariate
ANOVAs indicated that following a sad mood induction, partici-
pants who received emotionally engaging instructions exhibited a
marginally significant greater decline in general mood [F(1, 26) =
3.70, p = 0.07] and a greater incline in sad rating [F(1, 26) =
6.24, p < 0.05] than participants who received emotionally dis-
engaging instructions, compared to baseline mood ratings. No
difference was found between groups in happy ratings following
the sad films compared to baseline [F(1, 26) = 1.29, ns]. Following
a happy mood induction, participants who received emotion-
ally engaging instructions exhibited a greater incline in happy
[F(1, 26) = 5.25, p < 0.05] and general mood [F(1, 26) = 5.34,
p < 0.05] ratings, and a greater decline in sad rating [F(1, 26) =
10.21, p < 0.001] than participants who received emotionally
disengaging instructions, compared to ratings following the sad
induction.
Overall, findings of this study clearly rule out the possibility
that high levels of emotional engagement hinder autobiograph-
ical retrieval in general, and support the claim that high levels
of engagement specifically hinder mood incongruent retrieval.
Additionally, results suggest that a happy moodmay facilitate rec-
ollection of more mood congruent memories than a sad mood,
although mood does not influence recall latency of the first mood
congruent memory.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this work, we examined several hypotheses concerning the
influence of mood on the fluency of retrieving autobiographi-
cal memories opposite to the current mood. According to the
“sad valence hypotheses,” fluency of recalling memories opposite
to the current mood is expected to be impaired following a sad
film but not a happy film (based on Sheppes and Meiran, 2007),
whereas according to the “happy valence hypothesis” the flu-
ency of mood incongruent memories is expected to be impaired
following a happy film but not as much following a sad film
Table 3 | Means and SD’s (in parenthesis) of self reported happiness, general mood, and sadness ratings in Study 3, in the different emotional
engagement conditions.
Baseline Post sad induction Post happy induction
Engaging instructions Happiness 5.57 (1.16) 3.07 (1.54) 7.29 (1.44)
Gen. mood 6.43 (1.50) 3.21 (1.19) 7.5 (1.29)
Sadness 3.07 (1.64) 6.86 (1.51) 2.86 (1.70)
Disengaging instructions Happiness 6.07 (1.43) 4.29 (1.90) 6.79 (1.25)
Gen. mood 6.29 (1.54) 4.36 (1.74) 7 (1.24)
Sadness 2.29 (1.54) 4 (2.15) 2.79 (1.72)
Scales of all measures range from 1 to 10.
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(based on Isen, 1985). According to the “engagement hypothesis,”
the degree of emotional engagement impairs fluency of opposite
mood memories, thus less fluency of opposite mood memories is
expected following high levels of emotional engagement, regard-
less of mood valence (negative or positive). Our results clearly
support the emotional engagement hypothesis and yield some
support to the “happy valence hypothesis.” In Study 1, following
both the induction of sad and of happy moods, participants who
received emotionally engaging instructions had reported their
moods to be more strongly affected by the emotional stimuli,
had exhibited more than double the recall latency of the first
opposite mood memory, and had generated overall less opposite
mood memories as participants who received emotionally disen-
gaging instructions. Study 2 yielded similar FAM results inducing
only a happy mood, thereby refuting the possibility that results
of Study 1 were hampered by order effects. The fact that emo-
tional engagement groups differed in FAM performance but not
in self reported mood checks in Study 2 provides evidence that
emotional engagement and emotion intensity are separate and
independent from one another, and that impairments in mood
incongruent retrieval were not due to differences in the intensity
of the emotion but rather due to emotional engagement. Results
of Study 3 demonstrate that high emotional engagement does
not impede autobiographical retrieval in general, but only mood
incongruent autobiographical retrieval. Taken together, results
indicate that low levels of emotional engagement facilitate mood
incongruent retrieval and high levels of emotional engagement
hinder mood incongruent retrieval.
Partial support was also found for the “happy valence hypoth-
esis.” In Study 1 fewer mood incongruent memories were gener-
ated following a happy film compared to a sad film, and in Study
3, more mood-congruent memories were generated following a
happy film compared to a sad film. Mood valence did not affect
recall latency of the first memory. The fact that being in a happy
mood resulted in fewer mood incongruent memories and more
mood congruent memories is rather logical, as individuals in a
happymood are highlymotivated tomaintain this mood andmay
be reluctant to recall opposite mood memories (see e.g., Handley
et al., 2004).
Findings of the current work regarding emotional engage-
ment support the analogy proposed in the Introduction between
mood incongruent retrieval and task switching (Kiesel et al.,
2010; Meiran, 2010, see also Greenberg and Meiran, 2013). As
in task switching, retrieving memories opposite to the current
mood involved a behavioral cost. Moreover, this cost was sig-
nificantly greater when individuals were more engaged in the
emotional experience, as in the phenomenon of “switch asymme-
try” (Allport et al., 1994; Yeung andMonsell, 2003). We therefore,
suggest that the current findings provide preliminary evidence
regarding the link between moods and task-sets.
Various conditions have been found to affect mood incon-
gruent retrieval (see Singer and Salovey, 1988; Rusting, 1998;
Holland and Kensinger, 2010 for reviews). We suggest that emo-
tional engagement may be a common mechanism in many of
these conditions. Mood incongruent retrieval has been most
commonly linked to mood regulation, in which memories oppo-
site in valence to the current unpleasant mood are summoned
as attempts to attenuate current mood (e.g., Isen et al., 1978;
Isen, 1984; Josephson, 1996). Findings of the current studies
demonstrate that such regulation is directly related to emotional
engagement since the degree of engagement determines the abil-
ity to retrieve mood incongruent memories and therefore to
regulate emotions via such retrieval. Likewise, the retrieval of
mood incongruent memories is also facilitated when partici-
pants are unaware that moods are relevant to the experiment
(Parrott and Sabini, 1990). In these scenarios, individuals are
likely to disengage from their moods in order to focus on the per-
ceived experimental demands. Lastly, mood incongruent retrieval
is facilitated among individuals who tend to avoid negative emo-
tional stimuli (repressors; Boden and Baumeister, 1997), a pop-
ulation which avoids and disengages from negative emotional
stimuli by definition. Thus, given the current findings that emo-
tional engagement determines the fluency of mood incongruent
autobiographical retrieval, and the above reasoning regarding the
plausible involvement of emotional engagement in many of the
conditions affecting mood incongruent retrieval, we suggest that
degree of emotional engagement provides a parsimonious expla-
nation for the occurrence of mood incongruent memory in many
of these conditions.
The current work may bear implications regarding the field
of emotion regulation. Although recalling memories opposite
in valence to the current mood has been regarded as an effec-
tive means of mood regulation (Isen et al., 1978; Isen, 1984;
Josephson, 1996), findings of the current work suggest that reg-
ulation by means of opposite mood retrieval is difficult and
therefore may be inefficient in cases of high emotional engage-
ment. Moreover, individuals suffering from depression may be
highly emotionally engaged in feelings of sadness, despair, or
guilt (see Clemens, 2007). Following previous observations that
individuals suffering from dysphoria and depression often have
difficulty in effectively regulating their emotions by various strate-
gies, including retrieval of incongruent memories (Joormann and
Siemer, 2004; Joormann et al., 2007), we tentatively suggest that
high levels of emotional engagement may be a significant medi-
ating variable in the ability of such individuals to adaptively
regulate their emotions by means of mood incongruent retrieval.
However, further research is needed in order to better substanti-
ate such a potential mediating role of emotional engagement in
depression and other mood disorders.
An additional possible contribution of this study concerns the
FAM as a measuring tool in the study of emotion. Results of the
current work indicate that although the FAM has originally been
introduced as a measure of sadness (Sheppes and Meiran, 2007),
it may serve as a more generic measure of emotional engagement,
in positive as well as negative emotions. Having such an indirect,
behavior-based measure for emotional engagement which is con-
siderably less prone to demand characteristics than many other
measures and is independent of self reported emotion which may
be biased or inaccurate (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Hunt et al.,
2003) may prove useful in emotion research.
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